'Tertiarization' of manufacturing industry in the new economy. Differences in Hungarian companies by Salavetz, Andrea
1INSTITUTE FOR
WORLD ECONOMICS
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
W o r k i n g P a p e r s
No. 134                                                      March 2003
Andrea Szalavetz
‘TERTIARIZATION’ OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
IN THE NEW ECONOMY
EXPERIENCES IN HUNGARIAN COMPANIES
1014 Budapest, Orszagház u. 30.
Tel.: (36-1) 224-6760 • Fax: (36-1) 224-6761 • E-mail: vki@vki.hu
SUMMARY*
                                                
* The paper was prepared for and presented to the conference ‘The “New Economy” and Post-Socialist Transi-
tion’, TIGER Economic Institute, Warsaw, 10–11 April, 2003.
A thorough process of adjustment to a new
business environment and a new set of
competitive conditions have ushered a new
business model into the ‘new’ economy. Ac-
cording to this model, a sustainable com-
petitive advantage derives from an ability to
integrate hitherto separate activities in a
new, creative manner and combine ele-
ments of ‘old knowledge’ with new. The
new combination of activities has blurred
corporate boundaries. Manufacturers are
performing a rapidly increasing number of
services, causing a kind of ‘tertiarization’ of
manufacturing, which helps to blur the
boundary between the industrial and service
sectors as well. Incorporating service provi-
sion into manufacturing builds the bridge
between the old and the new economy, as
new-economy characteristics filter down to
the traditional areas of the economy, mak-
ing them more knowledge and technology-
intensive.
The accelerating process of tertiariza-
tion in advanced economies has special in-
terest for observers in transforming coun-
tries, of which the more advanced have al-
ready begun to follow the same path, al-
though they are still far behind. As these
countries were incorporated into the global
structure of manufacturing, during the
early years of the transformation from state
socialism to capitalism, there developed a
partial geographical separation of produc-
tion-related service activities from physical
production activities. Some of the physical
processing tasks have been assigned to
newly acquired and modernized firms in
transforming countries, but they have be-
come production facilities with a single
function, operating within their multina-
tional owner’s group. As factor costs in
transforming countries increase, however,
the initial competitiveness of simple proc-
essing activities there has been eroding.
Both local subsidiaries and parent corpora-
tions recognize that the only way to offset
the declining profitability of certain manu-
facturing activities is to redefine the role of
the subsidiaries in the value chain. This
means broadening their activities to include
some services.
The first chapter describes the con-
ceptual basis behind the tertiarization of
manufacturing. The paper then goes on to
develop some predictions about the changes
in the structure of international trade in
services, resulting from the tertiarization
process. It analyses some methodological
difficulties with statistics on international
trade in services – difficulties in quantifying
the volume and value of intra-firm services.
The next chapter recounts the findings of a
field survey taken in 2002. Ten engineering
subsidiaries of large multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) in Hungary were examined
for signs of integration of service activities
into their manufacturing. The survey looked
into the way the activity portfolio of the ten
firms had diversified and into the implica-
tions of this process for their profitability.
5INTRODUCTION
Academics, corporate analysts and private
investors are unanimous in stating that the
‘new economy’ has altered the market
valuation of firms. The relation between eq-
uity value and traditional financial and bal-
ance-sheet variables has changed. Strategic
managers are aware that companies now
have to capitalize on their own and outside
knowledge, so that the strategy of simply
slicing up the value chain and geographi-
cally optimizing factor costs no longer pro-
vides automatically a sustainable competi-
tive advantage.
One meaning of the label ‘new econ-
omy’ is that economic actors operate ac-
cording to a new business model, in which
the traditional factors determining com-
petitiveness no longer apply. Under the new
business model, knowledge becomes a more
important production input than physical
capital. The value of goods is determined
increasingly by intangibles such as brand
name, comprehensiveness of product-
related services, and so on. One vital deter-
minant of competitiveness becomes the
ability to combine new elements of knowl-
edge with traditional ones and thereby cre-
ate new, comprehensive value.
This combination of new and tradi-
tional knowledge blurs corporate bounda-
ries: companies are competing increasingly
often outside their traditional boundaries as
well. The best example of blurred bounda-
ries, of the increasing role of intangible
elements in value creation, and of the
widespread combination of new and old
elements of knowledge is the fact that
manufacturers carry out a rapidly growing
number of service activities, which pro-
duces a pronounced ‘tertiarization’ of
manufacturing industry.
The more advanced of the transform-
ing countries have already begun to follow
the same path, although they are still far
behind. In the early transformation years,
there developed a partial geographical
separation of production-related service ac-
tivities from physical production activities.
Some of the physical processing tasks have
been assigned to newly acquired and mod-
ernized firms in transforming countries, but
they have become production facilities with
a single function, operating within their
multinational owner’s group. As factor costs
in transforming countries increase, how-
ever, the initial competitiveness of simple
processing activities there has been eroding.
Both local subsidiaries and parent corpora-
tions recognize that the only way to offset
the declining profitability of certain manu-
facturing activities is to redefine the role of
the subsidiaries in the value chain. This
means broadening their activities to include
some services.
The field survey described in this pa-
per was carried out in 2002. Ten engineer-
ing subsidiaries of large multinational cor-
porations (MNCs) in Hungary were exam-
ined for signs of integration of service pro-
vision into their manufacturing. The survey
looked into the way the activity portfolio of
the ten firms had diversified and into the
implications of this process for their profit-
ability.
The first chapter describes the con-
ceptual basis of the tertiarization of manu-
facturing. Next, the paper develops some
predictions about the changes in the struc-
ture of international trade in services, re-
sulting from the tertiarization process. The
third section summarizes the findings of the
survey.
1) THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS BEHIND
INTEGRATION OF MANUFACTURING
AND SERVICE ACTIVITIES
Tertiarization of manufacturing can refer to
two things. One is the mounting importance
to competitiveness of the efficiency of inter-
nal services, above and beyond the tradi-
6tional determinants, such as quality of cor-
porate technology and human resources,
efficiency of operation, and volumes of as-
sets and current capital. Such internal
services include product and process devel-
opment, design, logistics, extension train-
ing, induction training, and value-chain
management. The last in itself is a complex
bundle of internal services, comprising not
only procurement of materials, but identifi-
cation of new suppliers, auditing of them,
technology transfers to suppliers and coop-
eration with them on increasing their effi-
ciency, improving quality, cutting costs etc.
Internal services also comprise organiza-
tional development and coordination, hu-
man resource management, accounting,
bookkeeping, and legal and financial serv-
ices. In short, competitiveness derives not
only from the efficiency of traditional proc-
essing activities, but from efficient organi-
zation and provision of internal services
whose number and complexity continually
increases.
The other meaning of tertiarization is
the growing complexity and importance of
external, product-related services to cus-
tomers for products. Product-service pack-
ages include not only maintenance and re-
pair, but financing of purchases, transpor-
tation, installation, system integration, tech-
nical advice on maximizing product bene-
fits, and operational support. Product-
associated services, as an intangible element
of output, account for a rising share of total
product value and manufacturing turnover.
The consequence is that the traditional
profitability calculations are becoming
meaningless. Analysts no longer calculate
the profit margin on individual products,
because products have to be seen as part of
a bundle or system of related products and
services. It is becoming increasingly com-
mon to apply a pricing strategy that allows
zero or negative profit on the core product
itself. The profits are then earned on the
related products and services.
There is nothing new about integrat-
ing manufacturing and service provision as
such. In 1995, the Fortune 500 list took the
demonstrative step of ceasing to publish lists
of manufacturing and service-providing
companies separately. Its unified list of top
American companies meant abandoning the
classification of companies by ‘primary’
products, which it was argued had caused
significant distortions for a long time (‘A
New 500 for the New Economy’. Fortune,
May 15, 1995). In an era when outsourcing
of manufacturing activities had become
common and a significant proportion of the
revenue of primarily manufacturing firms
came from services, it no longer made sense
to publish separate lists. By that time, 40 per
cent of the revenues of manufacturing giant
General Electric (GE) were attributable to its
service activities. Six years later, in 2001,
the share of its revenues deriving from
manufacturing and sale of goods was hardly
greater than that: 41.8 per cent (GE Annual
Report 2001, p. 2. Own calculation). The
sales share of goods at IBM, another basi-
cally manufacturing firm, was 42.7 per cent
in 2000 (IBM Annual Report, 2000, p. 16.
Own calculation).
It can be argued that the incorpora-
tion of services into manufacturing provides
a channel between the old and new econo-
mies, so that new-economy attributes can
seep through to old sectors of the economy,
making them more knowledge and technol-
ogy-intensive.
Cowan et al. (2001) identify three at-
tributes to distinguish manufacturing and
services (i) Services have an intangible
character. (ii) There is intensive participa-
tion by customers in service provision. (iii)
Provision and consumption of services coin-
cide in time. Zagler (2002) added a fourth
factor: the uniqueness of services. Each
service is provided individually for each
customer, whereas manufactures are made
in series, even in mass quantities.
The integration of manufacturing and
service provision is best demonstrated by
the fact that none of the factors just men-
tioned are exclusive to services. Looking at
the characteristics of goods manufacture in
the era of the ‘new economy’, one aspect of
7the definition of the new economy1 is the
‘dematerialization’ of products, i.e. the fact
that intangible elements account for a large
and increasing share of their total value. As
for the participation of customers in service
provision, this also applies to manufactures,
in an age of mass customization and wide-
spread manufacturing to customer specifi-
cations. There are more and more products
in whose production the customer partici-
pates intensively. As for the coincidence of
provision and consumption of a service, this
too can be said to extend to manufactures to
some extent. Modern inventory manage-
ment, delivery ‘just in time’, and custom
manufacturing practices have helped to
shorten considerably the time that elapses
between production and consumption of
manufactures. The other side of the coin is
that many types of services have become
standardized, entered international trade
almost like products. (Think of packaged
software, which is a service according to its
current trade classification.) The time be-
tween the production and the consumption
of these ‘services’ has become longer.
While standardization of services
takes a step away from uniqueness and in-
dividuality towards mass production, mass
customization of manufactures is a step to-
wards individuality. Here again, there is
convergence between manufacturing and
service provision.
2) TERTIARIZATION AND CHANGES IN
THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN SERVICES
Structural change – shifts in the GDP shares
of the three main economic sectors – is one
of the most conspicuous aspects of eco-
nomic development. Researchers extensively
discuss the changes in the proportions of
                                                
1 In the new business-model sense of the ‘new econ-
omy’, of which there are several definitions. See
Szalavetz (2000).
the three sectors (in GDP or employment),
make international comparisons, or exam-
ine the relation between changes in the
sectoral composition of manufacturing and
economic growth (Lucas 1988; Fagerberg
2000). However, little research has been
done on the aspect of structural change just
described: the integration of manufacturing
and services.2 This topic tends to be dis-
cussed more in international business lit-
erature focused on corporate strategy, re-
structuring of MNCs and the emergence of
networks.
Wise and Baumgartner (1999), for
example, remind practitioners that manu-
facturers' traditional value-chain role of
producing and selling goods has become
less and less attractive. Manufacturers have
to reconsider their strategic priorities, rede-
fine their core competencies and move
downstream, because that is where the
value, and of course the profits lie.
By contrast with restructuring moves
in the past, concentration on core compe-
tencies involves selection among activities,
corporate functions, not products. Instead of
dropping some products and concentrating
resources on making others, many tradi-
tional manufacturing companies have
abandoned manufacturing itself as a cor-
porate function. They have given up (or
contracted out) the physical processing ac-
tivity, sold their physical assets, and decided
to specialize in intangibles such as strategic
management, research and development,
marketing and so on.
The opposite side of the coin has been
the spectacular expansion of turnover and
business muscle by contract manufacturers.
The best-known contract manufacturers,
many listed in the Fortune 500, do not con-
fine themselves to manufacturing activities.
On the contrary, their success lies in pro-
viding all the product-related services, so
that the integration of manufacturing and
service provision has had a twin effects on
corporate boundaries, narrowing and at the
                                                
2 Exceptions include Marceau–Martinez (2002);
Tomlinson (2000)
8same time broadening the activity portfolio.
On the one hand, firms try to narrow their
activities and concentrate on core compe-
tencies, while on the other, increasing
numbers diversify into product and proc-
ess-related services to increase their value
added.
These, in principle mutually exclusive
tendencies have manifested themselves in
the emergence of global production net-
works (GPNs), embracing both equity and
non-equity relations, as documented by
Ernst and Kim (2002). The flagships or sys-
tem integrators of the GPNs have tended to
narrow their activities. In most cases, they
have given up manufacturing and concen-
trated on various internal services, while
providing strategic and organizational lead-
ership to the network.
Companies in the second layer of the
hierarchy – regional headquarters or prod-
uct-division leaders – have tended to
broaden their activities. Some may have
abandoned part of their manufacturing,
retaining only the technologically more de-
manding parts, while diversifying consid-
erably the range of their internal service
provision,3 by providing services to the par-
ent company and to companies on the third
level of the hierarchy: specialized suppli-
ers.4 The last, at the bottom of the hierarchy,
joined the production network as mono-
functional, production entities, but they too
have been striving to improve their network
positions and diversify their activities by
taking on production-related internal serv-
ices, and in the case of local market-
oriented investment, product-related exter-
nal services.
The spread of GPNs has had twin ef-
fects on the structure of international trade.
(i) The volume of internationally traded
services has increased spectacularly, as has
                                                
3 Second-layer companies also provide a complex
range of external services, of course.
4 The three layers described can be further refined,
of course, to distinguish higher-tier and lower-tier
suppliers. However, the simplification is possible
here as the issue is the pattern of narrowing or
broadening the corporate activity range.
the proportion of total trade that is network
related. (ii) The volume of intra-firm trade
in services has increased considerably,
which presents a number of methodological
difficulties with quantifying and docu-
menting in international trade statistics.
The increase in the volume of inter-
nationally traded services is statistically
well-documented. According to the OECD,
the value of the service exports of 30 OECD
countries in 1999 was USD 1097.3 billion,5
which meant there had been 3.2 per cent
annual growth since 1995.
International trade statistics provide
only indirect evidence that the importance
of intra-firm services is increasing. For in-
stance, although the volume of internation-
ally traded services keeps increasing, the
ratio of internationally traded services to
total trade has remained fairly constant over
the past few years: an average of 21 per
cent (OECD 2001, pp. 30–31). This calls for
an explanation, because the share of serv-
ices in total value added has been increas-
ing, to an average share of 70 per cent in
OECD countries.6
The explanation OECD offers (OECD
(2001)) is in line with Cowan et al.’s
(2001) reasoning: OECD traces the stagna-
tion of the share of internationally traded
services back to the fact that service provid-
ers are located near their potential custom-
ers and therefore a large share of services is
not traded internationally.
However, there is reason to believe
that the increase of intra-firm services and
the ambiguity with which this increase is
documented in international trade statistics
provide additional explanation.
                                                
5 Goods exports, on the other hand, stood at USD
4100 billion (OECD 2001, p. 30).
6 The world average is rather lower, but not less than
60 per cent (Freund and Weinhold, 2002). Some
figures for service shares of GDP in 2000: Belgium:
70.9 per cent; Denmark: 70.2; Finland: 62.1; France:
70.9; Germany: 67.3; Britain: 70.1; Hungary: 61.4;
Ireland: 55; Japan: 66.6; Netherlands: 70.1; Spain:
66.0; USA (1999): 73.9. (‘OECD in Figures’. OECD
Observer 2002. Supplement 1. Paris: OECD.)
9With the tertiarization of manufac-
turing and the emergence of GPNs an in-
creasing share of the intangible determi-
nants of value is produced in the form of
internal, intra-firm services.
Although subsidiaries usually pay for
the services granted by their parent compa-
nies, the costs of these services are listed
under the item of other costs, which item
includes the costs of services bought from
non-affiliated services providers as well.
Although OECD statistics contain an item
that quantify the service transactions among
affiliated companies, this is a residual item
containing management services, overhead
costs and ‘other services’ not elsewhere
classified. This means that an increasing
share of service transactions between affili-
ated parties remains undocumented.
Another methodological difficulty
arises from the fact of transfer pricing, from
the fact that the fee of internal services
rarely corresponds to the fee of similar
services bought from non-affiliated service
providers. This fee can exceed the market
price of the service, but it can also be infe-
rior to it, for strategic reasons. One of the
best examples of this latter type of distortion
is the system of internal financial pools,
which offers subsidiaries investment fi-
nancing at a cheaper interest rate than the
one of commercial loans. Each multina-
tional devises its own system of pricing in-
ternal services. These, like some other firm-
specific organizational decisions, greatly
influence corporate competitiveness.7
There appears to be a growing gap
between the real volume of international
trade in services and the one recorded in
official trade statistics. Our hypothesis is
that the increase in this gap correlates
strongly with the evolving complexity of
integration between services and manufac-
                                                
7 IBM, for example, uses a shared-resources concept.
The expenses of internal services are shared by all
company segments, while allocation of expenses is
based on the head counts of segments (IBM Annual
Report, 2000, p. 42:
ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/annualreport/
2000/pdf/IBM2000F.PDF)
turing. The more integrated the two sectors
become, the more difficult it is to quantify
either the contribution of services – as ‘in-
trinsically different sectors of the economy’





Field investigations were carried out at a
sample of ten companies in Hungary, all
subsidiaries of large, blue-chip multination-
als in the engineering industry. The survey
was intended to find out more about the
patterns of functional diversification in lo-
cal manufacturing subsidiaries. Semi-
structured interviews were made with
members of top management in the sample
companies.9 Because of the explorative na-
ture of the research, the sample was not se-
lected at random, but according to selection
criteria of size, ownership, owner’s integra-
tion strategy, and sectoral affiliation. (It was
assumed that the type of service activities
companies undertook would be industry-
specific. The sample was therefore limited to
one industry, engineering.) The main selec-
tion criterion was that the subsidiaries
                                                
8 The author’s hypothesis is supported by calcula-
tions from Tomlinson (1999). Drawing on the OECD
Input-Output Database (share of intermediate flows
of services as a percentage of the total), Tomlinson
compares four countries and finds that integration
between manufacturing and services is greatest in
Germany. This is interesting also because it is based
on international comparisons of sectoral contribu-
tions to national value added, in which some analysts
see Germany as a service laggard. (See Note 6.)
9 Alstom Power Hungária Ltd (ABB subsidiary ABB
Power Generation Ltd became an Alstom company in
2000, after a 1999 merger of the turbine businesses
of Asea Brown Boveri and Alstom into the Brussels-
based joint venture ABB Alstom Power, a Brussels-
based), Audi Hungária Motor Ltd., Bosch Rexroth
Ltd, Flextronics International Ltd, GE Hungary PLC,
Knorr Bremse Braking Systems Ltd, Nokia Hungary
Communications Ltd, Schneider Electric Hungária
Electric PLC, Siemens PLC, and Temic Hungary Ltd.
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should exemplify the various possible inte-
gration strategies.
It was also assumed that the scope for
local subsidiaries to diversify their activities
and engage in service provision alongside
manufacturing was greatly influenced by
the integration strategies of their parent
companies. If a multinational owner adopts
a global strategy, the scope left for local
subsidiaries to diversify their corporate
functions will be much more limited than it
is in the case of a multi-domestic strategy.10
Local subsidiaries integrated in the multi-
national organization with a multi-domestic
strategy usually offer various external and
internal services. These companies are do-
mestic market oriented. They co-operate
with their domestic customers, according to
their specifications, offer various after-sale
services etc.
One of the objectives of our in-depth
interviews was to investigate the character-
istics and the evolution of the relation be-
tween manufacturing and service activities
within the individual companies in the
sample.
We had two preliminary working hy-
potheses.
The first one was that manufacturing
and service activities are closely related to
each other. The diversification towards a
more complex package of activities, or cor-
porate functions is the result of a corporate
evolution process. The owners recognize the
local talent, the fact that local subsidiaries
are capable (possibly as a result of a corpo-
rate competence accumulation process) to
assume corporate functions other (and
more knowledge-intensive) than production
as well.
The second working hypothesis was
that the profitability of local subsidiaries
that assume a complex range of corporate
functions exceeds the one of single-
functional subsidiaries.
                                                
10 See Martin (1998) about the multinationals’ inte-
gration strategies.
The results of our field investigations
made us reject or at least modify both of our
preliminary hypotheses. Whereas in the
case of the first hypothesis, about the close
relation between physical processing and
service activities, reality turned out to be
much more complex than initially sup-
posed, in the case of the second, our as-
sumption turned out to be completely
wrong.
4) INCORPORATING SERVICES INTO
MANUFACTURING: TWO TYPES OF
ACTIVITY IN ONE?
In several companies in the sample, both
manufacturing and service provision were
found, although the two types of activity
had little or no relation to each other. Di-
versified multinational investors had cre-
ated ‘local empires’, establishing manufac-
turing subsidiaries and service subsidiaries
that operated under the same umbrella.
There were software companies, consul-
tancy firms, banks etc. alongside their
manufacturing subsidiaries.
Another pattern of integration of un-
related manufacturing and service activities
was found in companies that had R&D cen-
tres alongside their manufacturing facilities,
but the former were isolated from the latter,
since the R&D formed part of the global
R&D of the group. In other cases, of course,
the product development related to the
products manufactured on site. As a rule of
the thumb, it was found that the closer a
subsidiary’s R&D stood to basic research,
the more likely it was to be unrelated to the
local manufacturing. Conversely, the closer
it was to adaptive development, the more
likely it became that it was related to local
manufacturing.
In one company in the sample, even
the local sales activity was unrelated to the
local manufacturing! It operated in a cus-
toms-free area, manufacturing products
that were exported and distributed through
11
the owner’s global distribution chain. On
the other hand, the owner had local sales
offices for imported products. The imported
and locally manufactured products and the
exported products were identical, but the
ones manufactured in Hungary were ex-
ported because of the customs free zone,
while the ones distributed in Hungary then
had to be imported.
Although the interviews shed light on
the multiplicity of relations between manu-
facturing and service provision, it was
found in several firms that the incorpora-
tion of services had not followed the evolu-
tionary path predicted in the initial hy-
pothesis.
One basic terms in the international
management literature on subsidiary evolu-
tion is world product mandate (Birkinshaw
1996; Birkinshaw-Hood 1998), which
means the subsidiary has gained compre-
hensive responsibility for a specific product
or group of products as a result of an evo-
lution process. Under a system of world
product mandates, the corporate functions
associated with its specific product are as-
signed to the subsidiary as well, so that its
responsibility is total both functionally11
and geographically.
The interviews revealed that each lo-
cal subsidiary in the sample was trying to
initiate such a path of evolution, but only
one of them had managed to acquire a
world-product mandate so far.12 Local sub-
sidiaries managed to acquire responsibility
for a couple of corporate functions, but in
most cases, a regional, rather than a world
product mandate was the realistic long-
                                                
11 Responsibility will include design and develop-
ment of the product throughout its life cycle, elabo-
ration of process technology, manufacturing, and
provision of production and product-related serv-
ices.
12 The Hungarian subsidiary of GE was carrying out
and managing the global R&D for the group’s light-
ing division. The chief finance manager and CEO of
the division had moved to Hungary from London.
Also located in Hungary were various corporate
functions such as purchasing, marketing and con-
trol, at least up to EU level. They were being carried
out by global teams belonging to the corporation.
term objective of their evolution. Some sub-
sidiaries had become regional headquarters
over time, or at least managed to become
regional competence centres for specific
corporate functions.13 Regional competence
centres assume responsibility for specific
corporate functions at a regional level: sales,
distribution, logistics, training etc. Regional
headquarters have a nodal position in the
knowledge network of their multinational
owners, transferring knowledge and tech-
nology at a regional level to less developed
regional subsidiaries.
In some cases, the process of becom-
ing a regional competence centre coincides
with divestment of certain low value-added
manufacturing operations. Local subsidiar-
ies assume responsibility for management of
the relocation process and for launching
production at the new location. They pro-
vide technological assistance and consul-
tancy services on a variety of functional is-
sues (logistics, quality control, etc.) In ef-
fect, subsidiaries that lose a certain type of
production activity diversify into service
provision while managing the process of
relocating the production. (And in the ma-
jority of the cases, they continue to carry
out production activity, of a more technol-
ogy and knowledge-intensive nature.)
This optimum scenario applies only if
the new location is geographically close to
the one where the divestment takes place,
and not, say, in a Far Eastern country. Sev-
eral multinationals that have decided re-
cently to relocate production in Central
Europe, due to increasing local factor costs,
have preferred South-East Asia over neigh-
bouring Eastern European countries. Most
multinational investors do not seem to view
less advanced Eastern European countries as
safe, developed or predictable enough for
locating production facilities. It needs reit-
erating, therefore, that the level of devel-
opment in Eastern neighbouring countries is
                                                
13 It is important to differentiate between regional
headquarters and a regional competence centre. The
regional headquarters is what a local subsidiary may
become if it has gained regional competence in most
corporate functions.
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crucial to Hungary’s chances of becoming a
regional competence centre.
There is a third option besides those of
acquiring a world product mandate by inte-
grating all production related service ac-
tivities or becoming a regional competence
centre, and that is to acquire a comprehen-
sive local product mandate. Integration of
manufacturing and services at the local
subsidiaries of some brand leaders has taken
place under the auspices of services, not
manufacturing. Many firms that were
originally manufacturers now label them-
selves ‘solution providers’. Their core com-
petence or main business segment, they
claim, has become to provide strategic busi-
ness services and comprehensive solutions
to customers’ problems and needs.
This shift in corporate focus followed
a realization by many companies. Responsi-
bility for providing a solution and carrying
out a complex project (say the safety system
of a ministry, the logistics systems of a
manufacturer, an IT or communications
system, or a lighting and technical system
for a new theatre) is not generally awarded
to the best hardware provider. The tender is
won usually by the firm whose solution co-
incides best with the customer’s ideas. The
competition no longer takes place over
manufacturing the hardware, whose pa-
rameters are not considered decisive, be-
cause the various hardware elements in the
system are in principle interchangeable.
What matters is the creativity and of course
the price of the solution, so that the compe-
tition is concentrated on the services. The
winner of the project then tries to incorpo-
rate its own products and hardware into the
system, but selection of own hardware is not
automatic, not the only option, or necessar-
ily the best strategic solution. In providing
solutions, the integration of manufacturing
and services is coordinated by the service
provider, not the manufacturer.
Local subsidiaries of such manufac-
turing firms were usually created as mar-
ket-seeking investments. One important
finding of the survey was that these subsidi-
aries have the greatest chance of diversify-
ing their corporate function portfolio, en-
gaging in knowledge-intensive strategic
business services outside manufacturing,
and providing the most comprehensive
range of high local value-adding services to
local clients.
5) DIVERSIFICATION INTO SERVICES
AND ITS EFFECT ON PROFITABILITY
Another issue the field investigations ex-
plored was whether manufacturing subsidi-
aries that diversify into service provision
find that more profitable than simple
manufacturing.
The point of departure was the fact
that local subsidiaries usually pay their par-
ent companies for every kind of ‘assistance’,
i.e. internal service provision. The fee for an
IT specialist employed and sent by the par-
ent company is usually much higher than
that of a local IT expert. If local subsidiaries
can themselves provide the services neces-
sary for their operation, they can economize
on costs. This line of reasoning is supported
by anecdotal evidence, but the managers
interviewed pointed out that this in itself
does not increase the bottom-line value of
their subsidiaries.
Some subsidiaries have established
R&D centres and hired engineers to partici-
pate in the multinational owner’s R&D ac-
tivities. The costs of such local R&D centres
(hiring engineers, investments in comput-
ers, testing equipment, etc.) are included in
the subsidiary’s annual budget. The owner
covers such investment costs either directly,
through a direct transfer, or indirectly, by
permitting the subsidiary to spend locally
accumulated profits on such objectives. This
means that local R&D activity has not af-
fected the subsidiary’s profitability, as the
costs have been covered by the owner. If
local R&D activity corresponds to the prod-
ucts manufactured on site or is related to
the production process at the subsidiary’s
premises, the subsidiary has the responsi-
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bility for financing it. The revenue of a local
subsidiary derives from the contracted ‘unit
production price’ of its individual products.
Unit production price is multiplied by the
number of units produced to give net sales.
In principle, the contracted unit production
price may be somewhat higher if the sub-
sidiary’s activity covers a wider range of
functions. However, owners usually make
their subsidiaries compete with each other,
and even with potential outside contractors
for the responsibility of producing each new
product, unit production price cannot ex-
ceed a specified threshold irrespective of
how comprehensive the local activity port-
folio has been. The situation is similar with
other locally performed internal services
(procurement of materials, logistics, mar-
keting, sales, etc.)
However, subsidiaries strive to assume
responsibility for further manufacturing-
related services, even though diversifying
the range of these provided locally does not
affect the profitability of their operations.
The reason behind such ‘subsidiary entre-
preneurship’ (Birkinshaw (2000) is that it
tends to improve their status within the
multinational organization, so that they be-
come more embedded locally. If a local
subsidiary is assigned crucial corporate
functions, it becomes more important to the
multinational owner than it would be if it
only increased its local market share. An
increase in local market share is always a
marginal item in a multinational’s consoli-
dated bottom line, and in principle, local
market distribution can be arranged from a
foreign base as well. Undertaking responsi-
bility for specific global or regional corpo-
rate functions requires a knowledge base
whose retention within the multinational
organization is crucially important to its
owner.
* * * * *
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